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Abstract
We present a method to secure the complete path between
a server and the local human user at a network node. This
is useful for scenarios like internet banking, electronic sig-
natures, or online voting. Protection of input authenticity
and output integrity and authenticity is accomplished by
a combination of traditional and novel technologies, e.g.,
SSL, ActiveX, and DirectX. Our approach does not require
administrative privileges to deploy and is hence suitable for
consumer applications. Results are based on the implemen-
tation of a proof-of-concept application for the Windows
platform.
1 Introduction
Interacting with the local human user is the weak point
in client-server communications. While machines can em-
ploy cryptographical mechanisms to ensure authenticity, in-
tegrity, and confidentiality of communication, humans are
not capable of this. They rely on their local computer to
present data and transmit their input to a server reliably.
Today’s operating systems provide protection against
unauthorized modification of operating system components
and offer mechanisms like discretionary access control and
process separation to users and processes. Often, all pro-
cesses of the same user operate with the same privileges.
Malicious software (malware) can exploit this fact to read
input destined for other processes (e.g. a keylogger) or
modify the output displayed to the user (e.g. local phishing
attack). Some banks in South Korea already – including,
e.g., Korea Exchange Bank and Woori Bank – use ActiveX-
based tools to prevent the successful use of keyloggers dur-
ing internet banking, apparently after large-scale keylog-
ging attacks in internet cafe´s some years ago.
A server application needs a trusted path to the user at a
network node. This concept is not new and exists in oper-
ating systems. The secure attention sequence Ctrl+Alt+Del
in Microsoft Windows is an example of how the user can in-
voke a trusted path to the operating system to log on. Output
of a trusted path cannot be manipulated by other processes
and input cannot be read. The process using a trusted path
can be sure that input and output are shared only with the
user. This authenticity is important when using all kinds of
transaction systems, e.g. creating electronic signatures or
online voting.
We present related work in the next section, followed by
an analysis of the entities involved in secure client-server
communication. We then outline secure output and secure
input in sections 4 and 5. Security of the implementation is
discussed in detail in section 6. We conclude by examining
mechanisms aimed to improve protection against malware
in Windows Vista and by taking a look at other platforms.
2 Previous and related work
User interface security has always been an issue. Secu-
rity evaluation criteria like the TCSEC [23], CTCPEC [5] or
the Common Criteria [4] require a Trusted path to establish
a secure communication between the user and the operating
system. The TCSEC defines it as follows: ‘Trusted Path – A
mechanism by which a person at a terminal can communi-
cate directly with the Trusted Computing Base. This mech-
anism can only be activated by the person or the Trusted
Computing Base and cannot be imitated by untrusted soft-
ware.’ (p. 113)
A proposal for a user interface for SMITE prevents Tro-
jan horses from tampering with application output. [25]
Kernelizing the graphics server and delegating window
manager tasks to the application level is a prototypical solu-
tion in [7]. However, it is not compatible with the Windows
platform used on the vast majority of existing client com-
puters.
In the Microsoft Windows operating system, applica-
tions typically receive information about user actions by
messages. Since these can be sent by malicious programs
as well, they are a convenient attack vector. It is a vulnera-
bility by design – Windows treats all processes equally that
run on the same desktop. If one needs an undisturbed inter-
face, a separate desktop attached to the interactive window
station should be assigned. That approach is pursued by [1].
However, managing separate desktops can be cumbersome
for software developers. So most of today’s software that
interacts with a local user runs in a single desktop shared by
benign and malign programs.
This problem is encountered by local security applica-
tions such as electronic signature software [21], virus scan-
ners, personal fire walls etc. In [19] a dilemma is pointed
out when notifying users about security events. Users are
notified about presence of a possibly malicious program that
could hide that very notification immediately. Some im-
provements to dialog-based security are shown in [3]. Ap-
plication output should be defended against hiding. Actions
should be delayed so that users could interfere when a pro-
gram is controlled by simulated input or scripting. DirectX
can be used to achieve undisturbed output instead of the
co-operative Windows GDI. [17], [12], [13] Modifying the
web browser to convey meta-information to the user about
which window can be trusted is advocated by [28].
Window messages in event-driven systems in general are
discussed in [27] and [26] where a lack of authentication
is lamented. Rigorous filtering of messages is proposed.
A straight-forward alternative, outlined by [22], is to add
an authenticated origin to messages. It requires changes
in the decade-old backwards-compatible messaging system
and is hence unlikely to be adopted by Microsoft. In the X-
Windows system, a radical approach is pursued, allowing to
disable transmission of messages by the SendEvents func-
tion. There may be occasions, like computer-based training,
in which remote control of another application or parts of it
is desired. Only some applications expose an interface by
which they can be automated explicitly (e.g., via the Mi-
crosoft Accessibility API). Consequently, simulating user
input is a quick and convenient way for small helper ap-
plications. A reminder that messages can be sent between
processes running in different security contexts provide [15]
and [10]: ‘In the Windows user interface, the desktop is the
security boundary, and any application running on the in-
teractive desktop can interact with any window on the in-
teractive desktop, even if that window is invisible. This is
true regardless of the security context of the application that
creates the window and the security context of the applica-
tion.’ DirectX can ameliorate problems with forged mes-
sages. [13] We found one company reporting to use SSL to
encrypt input between the input device and the application.
They claimed they were using patented technology from
Korea, but were unwilling or unable to provide any patent
number or technical information on their product. [16]
Digital rights management (DRM) techniques also in-
tend to preserve integrity and confidentiality of displayed
information. However, the threat scenario is different.
DRM has to protect content also against the local user, we
need protection of the user against malware actions.
As is often the case, the problem could be solved by us-
ing a separate hardware device to display data and receive
user input. It would be just a physical representation of re-
stricted access to resources and processes. Unfortunately,
hardware incurs additional costs and does not lend itself to
fast and massive roll-out to a large user base.
3 Client-server interaction
A number of applications today are structured after the
client-server pattern: internet banking, contract signing, e.g.
in e-government, or online voting. Here, the main applica-
tion is run on highly protected servers. Users connect to
the server from their local machine. The machine acts as a
smart terminal, collecting user input, transmitting it to the
server, receiving server data and displaying server output.
The local user initiates and completes transactions with the
server application. This is depicted in figure 1.
Figure 1. Client-server interaction.
The server application does not interface directly with
the user. It connects to a client application; probably it is
an application (e.g. a web page, Java applet, or ActiveX
control) that was sent by the server in advance. This client
application runs alongside other processes. Most of these
are benign processes which do not interfere with the client-
server interaction, while some might have a malicious pur-
pose.
Processes are separated from each other by the client op-
erating system. They share resources, most notably files,
memory, and the user interface. Often, they are executed in
the same security context so that access control cannot be
used to distinguish different privileges. See figure 2.
The user interacts with a local application via the local
user interface. Some problems immediately arise:
1. How do user and application know which server they
are talking to?
2. How does the server know which application it is talk-
ing to?
3. How does the user know which application input is di-
rected to?
4. How does the user know which application produces
the output?
5. How does the application know that user received the
output?
6. How does the application know where input comes
from?
The first two problems can be solved by using a cryp-
tographic protocol that offers secure authentication of the
communicating parties and integrity of the communication,
e.g. SSL. The strength of the cryptographic algorithm relies
on access of the adversary to encrypted data and on it be-
ing computationally infeasible to decrypt the data or forge
a digital signature.
The remaining four questions demand a trusted path be-
tween the local application and the user. The local user in-
terface is the weak link in the interaction of the user with
the server application. An adversary is much more likely
to attack here than spending resources on breaking a cryp-
tographic algorithm – breaking cryptography is typically ei-
ther a formidable mathematical challenge or requires a large
amount of computing resources. Attacks on the server are
another option. However, a server is usually easier to pro-
tect than a large number of clients. Server protection is out-
side the scope of this article.
Figure 2. Local user interface architecture.
Malware may act completely autonomous or may have
a communication channel to a human agent. The human
agent could remotely control the malicious process or assist
it in analysing the situation in real time. An adversary could
launch a man-in-the-middle attack, trying to open a session
with the server and then mimicking the server towards the
client application. It could also try to simulate user input,
capture user input used for authentication, manipulate the
output to mislead the user or cover up input manipulation.
In our analysis we focus on Microsoft Windows XP/2000
and present an implementation of our local trusted path.
Windows XP is the system most likely in use at most clients.
We cover the successor of Windows XP – Vista – and also
look at alternative platforms.
We assume that the user works as a standard user and
is not running malware processes under an administrative
account. In that case we would not have to worry about a
trusted path, since the malicious process would find more
attractive targets exploiting its administrative rights.
4 Secure client output
Security of output to a window on a shared Microsoft
Windows desktop is limited. There is no confidentiality; all
processes attached to the desktop can capture the desktop’s
content and that of all windows on the desktop. There is
no integrity; all processes can modify the desktop’s content
and that of all windows. [29] It is a limitation by design
as all processes sharing a desktop are assumed to behave
cooperatively. If no cooperation can be vouched for, then
separate desktops are generally recommended to solve this
problem. The limitation described applies only when the
GDI (Graphics Device Interface) is used.
Another option is to use Microsoft DirectX as explained
in [12] and [13]. Microsoft DirectX is a group of tech-
nologies designed by Microsoft for running games. It is
an integral part of Windows XP (since Windows 98). Di-
rectX gives software developers a consistent set of APIs
that give improved access to hardware. These APIs con-
trol low-level functions, including graphics memory man-
agement and support for input devices. Of the various com-
ponents, DirectDraw/Direct3D is responsible for output de-
vices, DirectInput addresses input devices. DirectDraw al-
lows to access the display hardware in exclusive full screen
mode, keeping other programs from distorting the informa-
tion presented to the user.
DirectDraw works with surfaces on which processes can
draw. One such surface is the GDI surface that is shared
with the other processes in the current desktop. Surfaces
can exist in system or video memory. For increased secu-
rity, video memory should be used. Screen grabber soft-
ware can read from system memory, but not from video
memory. To avoid transfer of the content to system mem-
ory when there is not enough video memory available, we
use an overlay surface. Overlay surfaces are merged with
the primary surface representing the screen’s content. The
overlay surface’s content is shown at all places on the pri-
mary surface where the color key is used – one of the col-
ors in the surface’s palette of available colors. Pixels in the
color key’s color are replaced with pixels from the overlay
surface, as shown in figure 3. This does not modify the pri-
mary surface in any way. A screen grabber program that
might gain read access to surfaces in system memory can
only capture the primary surface’s content. The user mean-
while sees the content of the overlay surface that only exists
in video memory. Combination of the surfaces is done in-
ternally by the video graphics adapter and, hence, cannot be
tampered with. We achieve integrity and confidentiality of
screen output.
Figure 3. Combining overlay surface and pri-
mary surface.
Now that we have integrity, we need our control to au-
thenticate to the user. In principle every process is capable
of requesting fullscreen exclusive access to the screen. We
need to show the user a secret that only the server-provided
process and the user share. This technique is known as win-
dow personalisation.
As a shared secret we use what we call an application
hologram. It is basically a sequence of related images
shown in an animation. It could also be a single image,
but an animation is more likely to get the user’s attention.
The user is also more likely to notice its absence. The holo-
gram is made known to the user upon registering with the
service. Here, the same process can be used that also dis-
tributes a PIN code, a list of transaction numbers, or a secu-
rity token to the user. The hologram could also be selected
or uploaded by the user.
The hologram is transferred by the server to the ActiveX
control. For this purpose, an SSL connection is used. The
control uses a client key provided by the server when the
control was downloaded in the web browser. In this way
the server can verify that the hologram is requested by the
recently downloaded control instead of malware running on
the same host. The control is protected against accesses
from other processes by the process separation techniques
of the operating system. Hence, the client key and the holo-
gram are only known to the ActiveX control.
Hence, we can show arbitrary data in exclusive
fullscreen mode to the user. It cannot be modified or cap-
tured by other processes. The user can determine the data’s
origin by verifying that the correct application hologram is
present.
5 Secure client input
We look at authenticity/integrity and confidentiality of
user input. Input is affected by window messages, DirectIn-
put, SendInput, and low-level hooks.
Microsoft Windows uses an internal messaging model
to control Windows applications. Messages are generated
whenever an event, e.g. a key press or a mouse move, oc-
curs. However, not just user actions induce messages. Ma-
licious software can construct and send messages, thereby
simulating user input to dialog components. It is not pos-
sible for a program to distinguish between messages placed
in the queue by the operating system and messages placed
by another application. DirectInput retrieves information
before it is distilled by the operating system to Windows
messages. Hence, input synthesized by placing a forged
message in a program’s message queue can be detected and
ignored. The GetAsyncKeyState function provides a similar
way to verify if a key has been pressed/released or if only a
message has been sent.
If messages are not forged, input can be simulated by the
SendInput function. Key presses/releases and mouse move-
ments can be placed in the raw input queue. This queue
is used by both GetAsyncKeyState and DirectInput. Input
simulated this way appears in the same way as genuine in-
put.
Low-level keyboard hooks have access to the raw input
queue. Here, simulated input is marked with an ”injected”
flag. An application using this type of hook can thus detect
and discard simulated input. There are two drawbacks: low-
level keyboard hooks can be used to capture input to other
processes, e.g. by a keylogger, and other processes can in-
stall these hooks and remove the flag. A method to counter
this is to renew the hook permanently. The newest hook is
placed first in the hook chain and gets to process the input
data before it can be tampered with.
It may be possible to distinguish users and untrustworthy
programs by observing their input behaviour, e.g. programs
simulating input much faster than an ordinary user could
type. This rather falls in the field of behavioral biometrics.
[2]
Our solution uses DirectInput or the Win32 API function
GetAsyncKeyState (two implementation variants) to cope
with forged window messages. Defeating SendInput and
low-level keyboard hooks requires fast renewal of our own
low-level keyboard hook, e.g., every 100 ms.
Hooks are troublesome for another reason. A system-
wide hook is called by all processes in the same desktop.
An attacker could use a hook not only to process events, but
also to execute code of their choosing in the address space
of another process. Hooks can be disabled for a desktop
session, but then we also lack the possibility to detect sim-
ulated input.
We found a solution for this in combination with undis-
turbed output. As [8] shows, trusted output plus a single bit
of trusted input is equivalent to trusted input. User input –
genuine or simulated – is collected by our ActiveX control
and sent to the server. The server stores the data in prepara-
tion of the next transaction and echoes it back to our control,
adding a unique random value. The control shows the data
on its secure surface, together with its application hologram
and the random value. It then asks the user for confirma-
tion. The user checks whether the data for the transaction
are correct and if the application hologram is present. In the
positive case, the user inputs a one time password based on
the random value. In the negative case, the user closes the
session or otherwise aborts communication with the control
and the server – a single bit of trusted input.
The one time password based on the random value can
be implemented in various ways. We use a simple list with
transaction numbers (similar to those used by some banks
for their online banking) where the user looks up the trans-
action number associated with the random value. It could
also be computed by a token that shows a confirmation
number upon entering a challenge. The token then basi-
cally stores or computes a list with transaction numbers and
outputs only the number associated with the given random
value.
Hence, we cannot prevent malware from simulating user
input, but we can prevent simulated user input from having
an effect on the transaction.
6 Client security requirements
Operating system integrity – The security of our imple-
mentation of a trusted path for an application relies on the
integrity of the operating system.
We have analysed which operating system modules are
needed to download and execute our ActiveX control, and
which are involved in using DirectX. The operating system
is responsible for the integrity of its components. Windows
employs discretionary access control (DAC) and integrity
monitoring and restore of system files (WFP). Use of file
protection mechanisms is shown in table 1. Most files re-
side in the Windows or Program Files folder (or subfold-
ers). All are protected by access control entries preventing
modification by processes executing under a standard user
account. Some files enjoy protection by the Windows file
protection service in addition. None of the files used by In-
Usage Unprotected DAC WFP Total
Internet Explorer 0 112 24 112
DirectX 0 104 20 104
Table 1. Used files and their protection mech-
anisms.
ternet Explorer or DirectX is unprotected against malware
in a standard user account.
Non-developer system – DirectX comes in a run-time
version used on most systems and in a developer version.
While in the run-time version exclusive access provides
confidentiality of output, the developer version opens for
screen capture by malicious software. Hence, we recom-
mend installing the non-developer version of DirectX when
using our solution. Integrity is preserved in both variants.
Availability of the screen for output is handled on a first-
come first-served basis. Security-sensitive applications are
advised to request access in full screen mode early and use
application holograms to prove their authenticity to the user.
Screen capture software – Programs that are able to cap-
ture DirectDraw surfaces do so by API hooking from an
injected DLL. Using reverse engineering, we found that a
DLL was injected in running processes to capture calls to
the DirectDraw API. Once the adversarial code gets hold of
the COM interface pointer, it can access the surfaces from
the injected DLL and transfer screen contents to the capture
software. Similar methods could be used by malware. It
is imperative that other processes be prevented from inject-
ing code. Hooking can be prevented by several means. The
straight-forward approach is to disable systemwide hooks
for the desktop object. This could be achieved during lo-
gin. Another approach is to employ API hooking to re-
strict calls to the SetWindowsHookEx function. Both
techniques cannot be used from a server-provided ActiveX
control. However, hooks need to be prevented anyway. A
malicious process being able to execute code in the address
space of another process can affect the system’s security
performance adversely. There are more attractive targets
than performing (non-trivial) API hooking and screen cap-
ture. Analysing and modifying a surface reliably and unde-
tected in real time poses a high bar for an attacker.
Man-in-the-middle-attack (MITM) – MITM attacks in-
volving a spoofed server can be detected by use of the SSL
protocol. The user can check the certificate of the server
connected to.
User interface remote control – With the user interface
not being visible to malware, the attacker has to guess how
to simulate user actions. By observing mouse movements
or key strokes it might be possible for the attacker to learn
about the user interface straucture. We could vary the in-
terface slightly from time to time. However, the attacker
might as well simulate—the server collects the (manipu-
lated) data, sends it back and displays the data via the
trusted output, then asks for confirmation. If the data was
manipulated, the user can cancel the transaction. If the in-
formation is correct, the user enters a one-time usable trans-
action number. The number is bound to the data received.
We could also request the user to solve a CAPTCHA (Com-
pletely Automatic Public Turing test to tell Computers and
Humans Apart) before entering confirmation. [24] Malware
would not be able to solve it and hence, premature confir-
mation of faked data could be detected and rejected.
Our solution hence bears the following security proper-
ties:
1. We can prevent user interface modification (Direct-
Draw)
2. We can detect user interface spoofing when it happens
(Application hologram, SSL certificate)
3. We can protect user interface confidentiality (overlay
surface)
4. We can detect user interface remote control after it
has happened (window messages, transaction number
list/token)
5. We cannot prevent malware from denying service
Our focus is on a sound design of how protection mech-
anisms are used. If there are flaws owing to errors in the
implementation of the platform, they have to be covered
by other means. If one sees the Windows platform as an
insecure platform because of implementation flaws, one
should refrain from using any security-relevant software on
it. However, with the current market share, we have to offer
practical solutions that help users who do not want to install
a different operating system.
7 Outlook: Windows Vista
Vista – the new Microsoft Windows operating system
version – proposes some interesting techniques to improve
malware resistance. It is not yet clear if all the function-
ality currently present in the beta version will be in the fi-
nal product. Documentation is still incomplete at best; it is
mostly provided as short-lived weblog communication. For
our purposes of achieving an unmanipulated user interface,
MIC (Mandatory Integrity Control), UIPI (User Interface
Privilege Isolation), UAC (User Account Control), Internet
Explorer 7 Protected Mode, and the Desktop Window Man-
ager are relevant.
With Mandatory Integrity Control every process and ev-
ery securable object are assigned an integrity level: low,
medium, high, system. The level of the process must domi-
nate the level of the object to be able to modify the object.
MIC is applied before DAC (discretionary access control)
permissions. It especially protects operating system files
from modification. MIC in combination with User Interface
Privilege Isolation this prevents processes at a lower level
to send window messages to processes at a higher level. In
addition, it prevents hooks created by lower level processes
to be called by higher level processes.
Processes started by the shell usually run at medium in-
tegrity level. If our ActiveX control could be elevated to run
at e.g. high level, it would be protected from forged win-
dows messages and message hooks. However, high level
might require running the control with administrative privi-
leges, something we want to avoid.
User Account Control helps to run processes with few
privileges. Processes will execute with a restricted standard
user access token. If an action requires more privileges, the
operating system asks the user to provide proper credentials
to complete the task. Malware is hence restricted in its ac-
tion under all accounts. The operating system switches to
the logon desktop to show the elevation prompt using the
trusted path to the user. However, malware could pretend
to show an elevation prompt since the user does not use a
secure attention sequence and the prompt cannot prove its
origin.
Internet Explorer 7 will run in so-called Protected Mode.
It is basically a process running at low integrity level un-
der a user account of its own. It has write access only to
a small number of folders and registry locations. If Inter-
net Explorer gets compromised, malware cannot spread to
other locations in the system and is executed only under the
restricted account.
The output model is going to change. Windows on
the desktop are managed by the Desktop Window Manager
(DWM). When we acquire a device context for our Direct-
Draw surface to draw on, DirectDraw locks the surface.
This causes the DWM to enter a compatibility mode and
disable some of the fancy effects of the new user interface.
The system is still functional, though.
The biggest improvement as regards a trusted path for
applications will be User Interface Privilege Isolation, lim-
iting the use of system-wide hooks.
8 Other operating platforms
Java offers fullscreen exclusive mode access to the screen
starting with version 1.4. [11] This functionality is pro-
cided by the class java.awt.graphicDevice. Meth-
ods are very similar to the DirectDraw API. In fact, Java
uses DirectDraw if it is available on the platform. Other-
wise, fullscreen mode is simulated with a top-level window
filling the whole GDI surface. On Unix platforms, Java may
use X11. No API is provided to check for the authenticity
of input. It is not possible to use overlay surfaces that al-
ways are stored in video memory. Conventional surfaces
used for drawing can be placed in system memory by the
video driver.
The Java Native Interface allows access to platform-
dependent code. In principle, a Java application could also
use DirectDraw and DirectInput via this interface. If Java
was used as a replacement for ActiveX, the client security re-
quirements would have to include securing the Java Virtual
Machine against manipulation by untrustworthy processes.
Qt is a cross-platform development framework for Win-
dows, Mac, and X11. [18] If consists of more than 400
classes, many of which can be used for user interface con-
struction. Qt can also be used in conjunction with ActiveX.
However, Qt renders to the primary GDI surface under Win-
dows and leaves its output vulnerable to modification by
other processes. It might be possible to subclass or wrap the
Qt widgets to use DirectX instead. The single advantage we
see with Qt widgets is their independence of window mes-
sages. Malware cannot simply modify or influence the user
interface by sending window messages.
OpenGL is an industry standard API for 2D and 3D
graphics programming. [14] It is used to render graphical
objects to a frame buffer. Access to the buffer is controlled
by the cooperative window manager. OpenGL can hence
not guarantee exclusive access.
GTK+ is a multi-platform toolkit for creating graphical
user interfaces. [9] Like Qt or OpenGL it executes on top of
the operating system and cannot assure exclusive access to
user interface hardware.
Simple DirectMedia Layer (SDL) is a cross-platform
multimedia library designed to provide low level access to
input and output hardware. [20] Multiple platforms are sup-
ported, including Windows, Linux, and Mac. SDL does
not establish direct access by its own means, but leverages
the capabilities of the operating system. Under Windows,
DirectX is used if driver support is available. There exist
implementations that use SDL with DirectFB on the Linux
platform.
Linux offers neither ActiveX nor DirectX. Access to the
screen is possible using the fbdev frame buffer device. It
is hardware-independent and provides screen access from
the console. The frame buffer device is used by the API
layers introduced by GTK+ or SDL. The DirectFB project
[6] seems to offer more control over frame buffer access.
However, it has not yet reached a 1.0 version number, and
it remains unclear what has to be installed before a server-
provided local application can use the API. If applications
run under the X-Windows server, the X-Window window-
ing system is used. It manages cooperatively how windows
are drawn on the screen. It is possible to restrict the use of
the SendEvents function to simulate user input.
9 Conclusions
Communicating with the local human user is the weak
link in client-server interaction. We have presented a
method to ensure the integrity and authenticity of client-
server communication from end to end.
Our approach makes use of existing technology, i.e. SSL
and ActiveX to deliver an application to the user’s machine,
and DirectX to securely present information. No modifi-
cation of the operating system is needed and no expensive
hardware is employed. Installation can be done on-the-fly
and, hence, can be centrally managed and supported. In-
stant delivery also ensures that the process can bear a server-
implanted secret to authenticate to the server.
We provide components that application developers can
use in their own projects. They can be used to retrofit exist-
ing ActiveX controls with exclusive screen access and pro-
cess authentication. They can also be an example for devel-
opers including this technology in their applications from
the ground up.
Further research should include how the new version of
Microsoft Windows impacts the techniques and how other
operating systems could be upgraded to provide secure local
interaction. How to prevent denial-of-user-interface-access
by local malware is also an open question.
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